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Jun Ando
Empirical Analysis of Dual-Earner 
Couples’ Housework Behavior Using 
the Japanese Version of the General 
Social Survey (JGSS)-2006 Data
Abstract: In this article, I sample data from the jGss-2006 and conduct an em-
pirical analysis of the housework behavior of dual-earner couples in japan using 
their housework participation frequency as the dependent variable. the results of 
this empirical analysis show that the housework behavior of husbands with wives 
working part-time is explained by the gender display model while the housework 
behavior of wives is explained by the autonomy model regardless of their employ-
ment type. the results also show that the housework behavior of husbands with 
wives working full-time is not explained by either the economic exchange model 
or the gender display model.
Ando (2011b) sampled data on cohabiting dual-earner couples from the 2007 
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers conducted by the Institute for Research on 
Household Economics to determine whether the housework behavior of husbands 
and wives is explained by either the economic exchange model, the gender display 
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model, or the absolute income model. The results showed, on the one hand, that 
the housework behavior of husbands and wives is explained by the gender display 
model, but on the other hand, that the absolute income of wives not only has a sig-
nificant and positive correlation with the housework time of husbands, but also has 
a significant and negative correlation with the wives’ own housework time. Ando 
(2012) sampled data on cohabiting dual-earner couples from cohort A of the same 
Panel Survey conducted in 1993, 2000, and 2007, and empirically analyzed how the 
housework behavior of husbands and wives changed over time. Looking at 2007, as 
did Ando (2011b), the results showed that while the housework behavior of husbands 
is reflected in the gender display model, that of wives was not explained either by 
that model or by the economic exchange model. They also showed that the wife’s 
absolute income had a significant, positive correlation with her husband’s housework 
time, and a significant, negative correlation with her own time spent on housework. 
Thus, in this paper, I once again empirically analyze the housework behavior of both 
husbands and wives using data on dual-earner couples from the JGSS-2006.
Previous Research
The fields of sociology and economics attempt to explain the housework behavior of 
couples primarily using two models: the economic exchange model and the gender 
display model. The economic exchange model, which was developed in the field of 
sociology, is also known as the economic dependency model and as the bargaining 
model used among economists who were trying to explain housework behavior 
through the application of game theory (Lundberg and Pollak 1993, 1996; Mancer 
and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981). In this model, the spouse whose 
income accounts for a low percentage of a couple’s total income, in other words, 
the spouse whose relative income is low and whose economic dependence is high, 
will primarily take care of the housework, while the other spouse will primarily 
work outside the home, as part of the labor force. Thus, this model argues that the 
husband’s relative income is significantly and negatively correlated with his house-
work time, but significantly and positively correlated with his wife’s housework 
time. This relationship with the husband’s relative income likewise applies to the 
share of time spent on housework by both the husband and wife individually.
By contrast, the gender display model hypothesizes that if the husband’s relative 
income falls below a certain threshold causing his economic dependence to increase, 
he deviates from the gender norms of a male. Thus, if his relative income falls below 
that threshold, he will stop trying to increase his housework time or his share of the 
total housework time, and instead will start to decrease that time in an effort to neu-
tralize his deviation from the gender norm (Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000; Bittman 
et al. 2003; Evertson and Nermo 2004). In typical previous studies in the field of 
family sociology, the husband’s relative income and its square are used as independent 
variables, and the squared term is significantly and negatively correlated with the 
husband’s housework time and share of the time spent on housework, but significantly 
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and positively correlated with the wife’s housework time and share of the time spent 
on housework.1 In the field of identity economics, identity is explicitly incorporated 
into the utility function to explain the “irrational” allocation of housework and work 
outside the home by husbands and wives (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
Gupta (2006, 2007) emphasizes that when analyzing the housework behavior 
of wives, it is not relative income, but absolute income that must be used as the 
independent variable. He calls this the autonomy model, but this same model sug-
gests that the absolute income of the wife has a significant, negative correlation 
with her housework time, and that she will reduce her own time spent on housework 
by earning her own income and then using it in the market to purchase housework 
services. Gupta (2006, 2007, 2009) only estimated the housework behavior of 
working wives, but Ando (2011b) and Ando (2012) focused not only on the ab-
solute income of wives but also on that of husbands, referring to the model as the 
“absolute income model” and empirically analyzing the effects on the time spent 
on housework by husbands and wives.
Here I will introduce previous studies on these three models of housework be-
havior by husbands and wives in Japan.2 Ando (2010) participated in the Theories 
and Empirical Analysis in Behavioral Economics, a study conducted by the Meiji 
University Graduate School of Sociology conducted over three years from 2005 to 
2007. He used data obtained from the first survey conducted in November 2005 to 
estimate the share of housework hours of husbands using the gender display model, 
based on Akerlof and Kranton (2000), and showed that it is explained by a quadratic 
function. Ando (2011b) sampled data on cohabiting dual-earner couples from the 
2007 Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers conducted by the Institute for Research 
on Household Economics. The results showed, on the one hand, that the housework 
behavior of husbands and wives is explained by the gender display model, but on 
the other hand, that the absolute income of wives not only has a significant and 
positive correlation with the housework time of husbands but also has a significant 
and negative correlation with the wives’ own housework time.
Ando (2012) sampled data on cohabiting dual-earner couples from cohort A of 
the same Panel Survey conducted in 1993, 2000, and 2007, and empirically ana-
lyzed how the housework behavior of husbands and wives in that cohort changed 
over time. The results supported the idea that the housework behavior of husbands 
in 2000 and 2007 and of wives in 2000 is explained by the gender display model, 
while the housework behavior of wives in 2007 is explained by the autonomy 
model emphasized by Gupta (2006, 2007, 2009).
Analytical Framework
Sample and Variables
In this study, I sampled male and female respondents, as follows. I sampled work-
ing males and working females between the ages of twenty and sixty, who have 
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working spouses, from the male and female respondents of the “Basic Total/Code 
Table: Interview Survey Form,” the “Basic Total/Code Table: Drop-Off Survey 
Form Table A” (hereafter Form A), and the “Basic Total/Code Table: Drop-Off 
Survey Form Table B” (hereafter Form B) of the JGSS-2006 Sixth International 
Comparative Survey of Lifestyles and Attitudes. I then excluded respondents who 
did not answer the question and respondents who responded “Not applicable.” I 
also excluded couples in which either spouse was a student, or was retired or un-
employed. Thus, I created the final sample by matching the remaining respondents, 
by gender, with the Form A and Form B respondents.
The dependent variable is the housework participation frequency of the re-
spondent. The Form A questions were coded as FQ7CKDNR (Cooking dinner: 
frequency [respondent]), FQ7WASH (Laundry: frequency [respondent]), FQ7SHOP 
(Shopping: frequency [respondent]), FQ7CLEAN (Housecleaning: frequency 
[respondent]), and FQ7GARB (Taking out the garbage: frequency [respondent]), 
while the Form B questions were coded as SSFQ7CK (Cooking dinner: frequency 
[spouse]), SSFQ7WSH (Laundry: frequency [spouse]), SSFQ7SHP (Shopping: 
frequency [spouse]), SSFQ7CLN (Housecleaning: frequency [spouse]), and SS-
FQ7GRB (Taking out the garbage: frequency [spouse]). For both sets of questions, 
I used the following number of times to reflect the frequency of participation in 
housework by husbands or wives, and added them to get a total: “Almost daily” 
is coded as 365 times. “Several times a week” is 185.5 times (assuming three to 
four times a week, I calculated the average of 3.5 times for 53 weeks). “About 
once a week” is 53 times (calculating as once a week for 53 weeks), “About once 
a month” is 12 times (calculated as once a month for 12 months), “Several times 
a year” is 7.5 times (calculated as seven to eight times a year, with the average of 
7.5 times per year), and “Never” is 0 times.
The independent variables in the economic exchange model and gender display 
model are the husband’s relative income and its square. By contrast, the independent 
variables in the autonomy model are the absolute incomes of each spouse. For the 
absolute income of husbands and wives, I used the median value of the SZINCOMA 
(Respondent’s income: Total) and SSSZINCA (Spouse’s annual income: Total), 
and calculated the husband’s relative income from those.
The control variables are (1) the time spent on work outside the home of each 
spouse, (2) the educational background of each spouse, (3) the age of each spouse, 
(4) the number of children, (5) the presence of a youngest child age newborn to six 
years (6) the presence of a youngest child age seven to twelve years, and (7) the 
employment type of each spouse. For (1) I used the median value of each stage from 
the XJOBHWK (work hours outside the home/week) and SSJBHRWK (work hours 
outside the home/week [spouse]). For (2), from the XXLSTSCH (highest level of 
education [respondent]) and SSLSTSCH (highest level of education [spouse]), I 
assigned the values 1 for “junior high school-new system,” 2 for “high school-new 
system,” 3 for “vocational school-new system,” 4 for “junior college-new system,” 
5 for “university-new system,” and 6 for “graduate school-new system.” For (3), I 
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used the median value for each stage from the AGEB (age) and SPAGEX (spouse’s 
age). For variables (4), (5), and (6), I created data from the FF[01-09]REL (Family 
[1-9]: Relationship) and FF[01-09]AGE (Family[1-9]: Age). And for variable (7), 
I excluded “managers/executives,” “self-employed people and freelancers,” and 
“workers in a family business” from the TPJOB (employment type) and SSTP-
JOB (employment type [spouse]), and assigned the value 1 to “general full-time 
employees” and 0 to “occasional employees (part-time work, work for a family 
business)” and “temporary workers.”
Also, to confirm whether the wife’s employment type has an effect on the coef-
ficient of the independent variables, I included in the estimation formula a cross-term 
created by combining each independent variable (i.e., the husband’s relative income, 
its square, the husband’s absolute income, and the wife’s absolute income) with a 
dummy variable reflecting the wife’s employment type (full-time). To limit the pos-
sibility of multicollinearity from occurring as a result of the addition of a cross-term, I 
normalized the dummy variable to an average of 0 with a standard deviation of 1.
Models
Ando (2011b) and Ando (2012) estimated the following three models in the process 
of analyzing whether the housework behavior of husbands and wives in dual-earner 
households is explained by the economic exchange model or the gender display 
model.
Model I: yi = α0i + α1iX + α2i X 2 + α3iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2 (1)
Model II: yi = α0i + α1iX + α3iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2 (2)
Model III: yi = α0i + α2iX 2 + α3iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2, (3)
where, yi is the housework participation frequency, X is the husband’s relative 
income, Z is the control variable, ε0 is the disturbance term, and i indicates gender 
(1 for males, 2 for females). Because it is easily understood that multicollinearity 
could occur between X and X2 in Model I, that model is not used in the determina-
tion of housework behavior. For husbands, regardless of the estimation results of 
α1i in Model II, if α1i is estimated to be significant and negative in Model III, the 
gender display model is supported. If a significant and negative α1i is estimated in 
Model II and an insignificant α2i is estimated in Model III, the economic exchange 
model is supported.
Like Ando (2011b) and Ando (2012), the following absolute income model can 
be estimated:
Model IV: yi = β0i + β1hh + β1ww + β2iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2. (4)
In addition, in this study, the following Models 5 and 6 can be estimated for 
husbands and wives, respectively:
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Model V: yi = β0i + β1hh + β2iZ + ε0 , i = 1, 2. (5)
Model VI: yi = β0i + β1ww+ β2iZ + ε0, i = 1, 2, (6)
where, h and w are the absolute income of husbands and wives, respectively.
Empirical Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the male and female respondents, based on the wife’s 
employment type, are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The housework participa-
tion frequency of husbands is 242.32 times when his wife works full-time, and 276.08 
when his wife works part-time. By contrast, the housework participation frequency is 
1,155.82 times for wives working full-time and 1,368.57 times for wives working part-
time, indicating that housework is overwhelmingly biased toward wives. Table 1 shows 
that when a wife works full-time, she spends more time at work than her husband, as 
he works an average of 38.21 hours a week and she works an average of 45.97 hours a 
week. This is likely attributed to the fact that 96 percent of husbands whose wives work 
part-time, and husbands of all female respondents, regardless of their employment type, 
are employed full-time, while only 60 percent of husbands whose wives work full-time 
are employed full-time. The average husband’s relative income when his wife works 
full-time is 0.71 (male respondents) and 0.60 (female respondents). It is 0.85 when his 
wife works part-time, regardless of the respondent’s gender.
Results of the Empirical Analysis
housework Behavior of husbands
The results of my empirical analysis on the housework behavior of husbands using 
the Tobit models, as well as the cross-term estimation results are shown in Tables 
3 and 4. Neither the husband’s relative income nor its square is significant in 
Model II or III of Table 3. However, the cross-term calculation results for Models 
II and III in Table 4 show that the relative income of a husband whose wife works 
part-time and its square term are significantly and negatively correlated with that 
husband’s housework participation frequency, and by contrast, that neither corre-
lation is significant in the case of a husband whose wife works full-time. In Table 
3, the husband’s and wife’s annual income in Model IV as well as the husband’s 
annual income in Model V are all insignificant. However, the cross-term calculation 
results in Table 4 indicate that the annual income of husbands whose wives work 
part-time is significantly and negatively correlated with his housework participa-
tion frequency in both Models VI and V. The wife’s annual income is insignificant 
regardless of her employment type (Table 4, Model IV).
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Next we discuss the control variables. Table 3 shows that the variables that have 
a significant correlation with the husband’s housework participation frequency are 
the number of children and the husband’s status as a full-time employee (dummy 
variable). If the husband works full-time, the more children a couple has, the lower 
the husband’s housework participation frequency will be. It also shows that the 
wife’s status as a full-time employee (dummy variable) has a significant, positive 
correlation at the 5 percent level only in Model II. The work hours of both husbands 
and wives have a negative, but insignificant, correlation with the housework par-
ticipation frequency of husbands. The husband’s age and highest level of education 
have positive correlations with the husband’s housework participation frequency 
in Models I, II, and III, and negative correlations in Models IV and V, but none 
of these correlations are significant. The wife’s age has a positive correlation in 
every model, and the wife’s highest level of education has a negative correlation 
in every model with the husband’s housework participation frequency, but none of 
these correlations are significant. The presence of a youngest child age newborn to 
six years, which corresponds generally to pre-kindergarten-age children, and the 
presence of a youngest child age seven to twelve, which corresponds generally to 
elementary school-age children, have a positive and negative correlation, respec-
tively, with the husband’s housework participation frequency. However, neither of 
those correlations is significant.
housework Behavior of wives
Next we look at the results of the empirical analysis of the housework behavior of 
wives. The results of my empirical analysis of the housework behavior of wives 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods, with and without cross-terms, are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6. Neither the husband’s relative income nor its square 
is significant in Model II or III of Table 5. In the cross-term calculation results 
shown in Table 6, the husband’s relative income does not correlate in Model II 
with either full-time working wives or part-time working wives at the 5 percent 
level of significance. However, this is not to say that it is impossible to see some 
significance at about the 5 percent level in the case of the former. The square of 
the relative income of husbands is not significant regardless of the wife’s employ-
ment type. We now look at the estimation results of the absolute income model. 
In Model IV of Table 5, neither the absolute income of the husband nor that of 
the wife is significant; even in Model VI, which reflects the autonomy model, 
the wife’s absolute income is insignificant. However, the cross-term calculation 
results shown in Table 6 indicate that in Model IV, only the absolute income of a 
wife working full-time has a significant, negative correlation with her housework 
participation frequency, but in Model V, which is estimated without the husband’s 
absolute income, that is, in the autonomy model, the wife’s absolute income has 
a significant, negative correlation with her housework participation frequency 
regardless of her employment type.
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Finally, we discuss the control variables in Table 5. The correlation between the 
husband’s time spent working outside the home and the housework participation 
frequency of his wife is positive, but insignificant. By contrast, the wife’s time 
spent working outside the home is significantly and negatively correlated with 
the dependent variable. The correlation between the husband’s highest level of 
education and the housework participation frequency of his wife is negative, 
but insignificant. On the other hand, the wife’s highest level of education has a 
significant, positive correlation with her own housework participation frequency. 
Neither the husband’s age nor the wife’s age is significant. The number of children 
significantly increases the wife’s housework participation frequency. The presence 
of a youngest child age newborn to six years, which corresponds generally to pre-
kindergarten-age children, and the presence of a youngest child age seven to twelve, 
which corresponds generally to elementary school-age children, both increase the 
wife’s housework participation frequency, but not to a significant degree. Neither 
the employment type of husbands nor that of wives has a significant correlation 
with the wife’s housework participation frequency.
Conclusion
In this study, I analyzed the housework behavior of dual-earner couples using data 
from the JGSS-2006. My conclusions are as follows. From the perspective of the 
economic exchange model and the gender display model, in which the husband’s 
relative income is used as the independent variable, the housework behavior of hus-
bands whose wives work full-time is explained by the economic exchange model, 
while that of husbands whose wives work part-time is explained by the gender 
display model. Also, it is not impossible to conclude that the housework behavior 
of wives who work full-time is explained by the economic exchange model. On 
the other hand, from the perspective of the absolute income model, which uses the 
absolute incomes of both husband and wife as independent variables, it is clear that 
the wife’s housework behavior is explained by the autonomy model, regardless of 
her employment type, and that the housework participation frequency of a husband 
whose wife works part-time is reduced by his work outside the home.
The conclusions drawn from these estimation results are inconsistent with the 
results of Ando (2011b) and Ando (2012) due to differences in the dependent vari-
ables used. However, the results of previous studies and of the empirical analysis 
in this study are consistent with Gupta (2006, 2007, and 2009), who argued that a 
wife’s housework behavior is explained by her absolute income. The findings of 
Oropesa (1993), Cohen (1998), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), and Brandon 
(1999) showed that the wife’s absolute income, more than the husband’s, has a 
large and significant, positive correlation with housework service expenditures 
and rates of use, and that husbands and wives use their incomes in different ways. 
However, if such a tendency were to exist among working wives in Japan, they 
would reduce their own housework behavior by working outside the home and 
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earning their own incomes. Thus, the role that should be played by the govern-
ment in reducing the burden of housework, which is heavily biased toward women 
in Japan, and in helping wives achieve a better work–life balance, is to promote 
female employment and to close the gender income gap by raising the wages paid 
to female employees.
Notes
1. Brines (1994) formulated a gender display model with a cubic function as well as a 
quadratic function.
2. For examples of previous studies from outside of Japan, see Ando (2010, 2012). For 
previous studies on gender display other than empirical analyses using individual data, see 
Ando (2011a, c).
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